[for a quick summary, see the third last paragraph]
Thought I’d start off with a nice simple topic that’s totally not heavily debated- free will! I’m not going to argue that we have or don’t have free will, rather I’m more interested in exploring the psychological effects of either belief. Let’s jump right into it.
Belief in free will—> endorsing a proposition, such as that everything that people have done and will do, is caused, and whatever is caused couldn’t have been done differently or chosen differently. One could either think that is true, or not- we’ll call that a belief in a free will, and of course an issue is settling on a shared definition of free will.
A “feeling of free will”—> the experience of having free will; not just an intuition that it’s real but supposedly experiencing it in the way that we experience the realness of red or the realness of sound. This could be even more difficult to define in an agreed upon way, because we have to ascribe words to something that is not semantic or propositional.
What might a feeling of free will entail? Some plausible answers include exerting willpower or self-control, voluntary thoughts and actions, deliberating between different options, a feeling of having conscious control or being the source of your thoughts and intentions, and this feeling of being a little homunculus behind your eyes on the edge of experience authoring each thought and intention (one particular sense of self). All of the above are things we commonly do and experience, and they often get labeled as a feeling of free will because they seem to prove (or motivate believing) the proposition that free will is real, thus they drive a belief in free will for many people.
“Feelings of free will” need not lead to a belief in free will
Without getting into the philosophical debate, what I first want to suggest is simply that these can be decoupled; that is, we can experience those “feelings of free will” without believing we have free will (of course in this case you probably wouldn’t call those feelings of free will, you might use a different word like agency or control). On the flipside, if you do not believe in free will, that is you reject the proposition that people could have done otherwise, you could still admit the existence of those feelings of agency and recognize their utility. An abstract belief in free will and feeling states of psychological control need not go together.
Now we face two objections. Those who believe that free will is self evident from our experience will insist that our states of psychological control ought to inform a belief in free will, and, some of those who are highly skeptical of free will argue either those states of psychological freedom are illusory (they are in fact not liberating and not what we think they are) or that we are better off without indulging in those states.
Two Modes of Being- Thinking About the Past/ Future and Engaging With The Present
To help make this distinction between a belief and a feeling of free will/ agency, let’s consider the distinction Kahneman makes between the “remembering self” and the “experiencing self”. Kahneman uses this to describe two different types of happiness or satisfaction- one we get when looking back on what we did and the other about how happy we feel in the moment. For our purposes, we’re interested in this larger difference between reflection (being able to think in detail, typically when we’re in private or not engaged in a difficult task) and being engaged in the present (doing something, focusing on your surroundings, reacting to the world). States of reflection could include “mental time travel”, imagining possible scenarios, mentally preparing, analyzing, and evaluating, whereas when we’re engaged in the present and have to act, we typically don’t have time to reflect, we have to stay focused on the situation and respond to it. This reminds me of poet David Whyte describing instances in life when we’re on the stage and we have to act with the tools we currently have, whereas in other instances we can prepare for the stage and refine our existing tools and skills. There are even different neural correlates for reflecting vs being engaged in the present. The brain’s “default mode network” seems to be more active during these periods of reflection when individuals are not immersed in a difficult task or focused on their present surroundings, however this network is involved in some tasks and is thought to represent acquired knowledge. So a more grounded distinction perhaps is the difference between being on “autopilot”, that is relying on past knowledge and habits, vs exploring and trying new things. Sticking to what you know and changing things up could happen while we reflect or while we act, however there do seem to be situations that are more conducive for deep reflection and situations where we are “on the stage”, like in social interactions, and have to be engaged with the present.
Free will beliefs are relevant for periods of reflection, not for present engagement
I am still thinking through how to construe different modes of being, nonetheless, currently, I am of the mind that we can largely map (dis)beliefs in free will onto modes of reflection, whereas the feeling of agency or free will often takes place when we’re “on the stage”, having to act and react to the present moment. For example, consider yourself looking back and evaluating some of your recent past behavior. It is in this instance when a belief or disbelief in free will is relevant, therefore one’s attitude towards free will could likely be activated here. When looking back you might imagine many other ways you could have responded to a situation, giving you the sense that you could have chosen to behave differently (hence at least tacitly assuming you have free will). A free will skeptic may still engage in the same process, imagining better ways they could have responded to a past event, but they would remind themselves that what they did was caused by the circumstances at that time, and if a similar situation were to present itself, then they should try to respond to that in a better way, which they could imagine to help prepare (and of course free will believers can engage in this useful preparation for the future, but it is possible they could feel more regret for a past mistake if they truly believe they could have acted differently in that moment). The main takeaway here is that when we are reflecting on the past and future, that is an appropriate time for beliefs in free will to become salient and activated, an abstract belief in free will is simply relevant and has consequences for how we think about the past and future.
However, when we are not thinking about the past and future, when we are and ought to be engaged in the present, such an abstract belief in free will is less relevant and therefore less likely to become salient and activated in one’s mind. Instead, this is where feelings of free will or agency are more likely to manifest or be present. Feelings of agency could also underlie our reflective states when we think about the past and future too, arguably when such reflection is intentional and if we are deliberating between multiple options. The intentionality behind thought and action matters, and this is also not an arbitrary distinction- goal directed intentions are associated with activity from the “frontoparietal control network”, sometimes called the central executive network or cognitive control network. To reiterate, while an abstract belief in free will is only relevant when we reflect on the past and future, feelings of agency can be present when we are reflecting and when we are engaged in the present. Further, I think that feelings of agency often support and justify a belief in free will. Like I said, these can be disassociated from each other, which I think is important, but this often does not seem to happen. I also quickly want to acknowledge research that has found other psychological motivators for an abstract belief in free will, such as the desire to blame and hold wrongdoers accountable. This is important, however what I’m interested in here is what underlies the belief that we have free will. Hearing about people doing terrible things can activate and strengthen (and perhaps foster) a belief in free will wherein this belief is applied to wrongdoers and used as a justification to punish them. Some even argue that this is how a belief in free will evolved, however I think the more relevant and ongoing antecedent of free will beliefs are these feelings of agency. Feelings of agency or free will such as exerting willpower, intentional thoughts and actions, deliberating between different alternatives, feeling like the conscious source of thoughts, and this feeling of being a little homunculus self behind your eyes inside your head, all have adaptive functions and are then susceptible to being interpreted as evidence for having libertarian free will.
Being skeptical of free will while still embracing feelings of agency
Good news free will skeptics, you may be able to have your cake and eat it too. That is, they do not need to endorse any libertarian free will propositions when reflecting on the past and future, yet their free will skepticism has no relevance or implications when they are engaged in the present acting and reacting, making use of and experiencing feelings of agency. Some may believe that rejecting free will has implications for how we live our entire lives, such as that it zaps out any meaning or any impetus to make smart choices or to live a good life. This is a fatalistic attitude that is not a necessary consequence of disbelieving in free will. This has been refuted many times before, however what I will point out is that ironically enough, we seem to be caused or wired to care about life, and the lives of others. Even if we succumb to that faulty fatalistic attitude, we still experience drives, like urges to eat, to form relationships, to avoid pain, to move, and so forth. Of course, debilitating depression is real and may be a result from extreme fatalistic thinking, although there are usually other factors that cause depression, to me at least it seems more likely that someone who is prone or already has depression will find fatalistic thinking more intuitive and attractive, rather than an ordinary person becoming clinically depressed after adopting a fatalistic attitude. Nonetheless, I think this is good news for free will skeptics. Libertarian free will is becoming increasingly difficult to seriously defend, hence why many philosophers are “compatibilists” on this subject, viewing determinism (the law of cause and effect) and free will as compatible with each other. This depends on how one defines these terms, as free will can be construed in a way that is not compatible with determinism. The most or at least one of the most compelling reasons for believing in free will, is the existence of those feelings of free will or agency. Free will believers may be more open to revisiting and questioning the veracity of libertarian free will if they realize that their feelings of agency and freedom are still valid, real, and consequential. It may be odd to imagine how free will could be false if we have these feelings of agency, but this is where the reflective vs present engagement distinction comes in handy. A belief in free will is only relevant to how we think about the past and future rather than about our present engagement. When we’re engaged in the present we’re not reflecting on counterfactuals, we simply seem compelled or caused to focus on what’s happening in the here and now, which is a natural phenomenon that is not contingent on a belief or disbelief in free will, similar to those urges and drives we inevitably feel even if we’re fatalists. The brain does not need any philosophical rationale or justification to attend to the present, especially when we are faced with novelty or a challenge, these sorts of circumstances seem to naturally divert more outward oriented attention and focus. You may also notice that this way of describing our engagement with the present (which I’m arguing is often associated with feelings of agency) is compatible with determinism, or that it does not require a belief in free will. That is, our feelings of agency, are natural, caused, and almost always inevitable (or are they?).
What Exactly Are “Feelings of Agency”? Getting Under the Hood
Now we should explore and unpack these “feelings of agency/free will” more. Although what I’ve been lumping under this category are all fairly different mental processes (using self-control, voluntary thought and behavior, deciding amongst different choices, and a feeling of self) they all seem like likely candidates of fostering and rationalizing a belief in free will (again, this need not be the case but it often happens to be, perhaps when people have not seriously thought about this topic). Another common theme amongst those disparate mental phenomena perhaps, is that they all seem to rely on or suggest the existence of a conscious self. Indeed, many like Sam Harris has argued that free will and the sense of self are two sides of the same coin.
A ”sense of self” can also refer to various different psychological phenomena. Sometimes researchers in this area distinguish between the “narrative” or “autobiographical” self, and the feeling of being a separate subject from the world and others. The former includes certain thoughts, typically ones with “I”, and the latter is more of a feeling or sense of perceptual separation let’s say. There’s also a sense of “mineness”, a feeling that one’s subjective phenomena are one’s own and that they are unified coherently. I’m not sure how exactly to parse this, but I think we could say that for any kinds of thought, the degree of attachment with said thoughts varies, meaning that we could feel quite attached to our narrative thoughts/self, or not so attached to it. However, this identification of thought may make certain thoughts more likely of arising, such as narrative thoughts, suggesting that when we do identify with thought, it’s more likely to take form of this narrative self. I’m not entirely sure if there is a distinction between being absorbed or lost in thought, and identification or attachment with thought. Both connote some kind of closeness with thoughts and an inability to stand back from them to witness them arise and fade. However, there could be differences in a sense of controllability over our thoughts which we could apply to the absorbed in thought vs identifying with thought distinction. We can get lost in thought such as being immersed in mind wandering; we could be in a bit of a daze and struggle to recollect what we were just thinking if asked, not being completely aware we were even thinking in the first place. It simply takes over us like when we helplessly scroll on social media like a zombie, regaining consciousness after a while. Yet purposefully thinking, or deliberately speaking and carefully crafting each sentence, being focused and mindful of each thought or word we say, could qualify for identifying with thought, but with more awareness and a greater sense of control. Presumably being absorbed in thought without metacognitive awareness or intention would mainly involve the default mode network, whereas purposefully thinking and feeling attached to one’s thoughts and words would require the frontoparietal control network to coactivate with the default mode network.
Are We Better Off Without “Egoic States”?
Some free will skeptics argue that the sense of self, let’s say this identification with (mostly narrative) thought, is what largely drives people’s intuition that they have free will, forming the basis for their belief in free will. A central tenet of Buddhism is that this sense of having an ego or conscious self or inner homunculus authoring our thoughts which we feel identified to, is an illusion that precipitates much needless suffering. On a but of a side note, very recently a new neural network was identified- a somato-cognitive action network (SCAN) which indicates that the brain does not only have one homunculus (one representation of the body) but has three different representations dedicated to different parts of the body which are intimately involved in planning movements of the whole body. This speaks to the close link between a sense of self and the act of control and voluntary planning. Harris’ description, as the sense of self that you are somewhere behind your eyes appropriating experience, or on the edge of experience, piercing into it and manipulating it, still stands, and he argues that this is an illusion that can vanish when paying careful attention.
If the existence of free will is questioned which is thought to come from some forms of selfhood and identification of thought, then it is often assumed that we don’t need to enter this mode of being. If the self is an illusion, then shouldn’t we cut through it and live in truth, assuming that living in truth and seeing reality more clearly is better and more useful? If identifying with thought drives the false belief of having free will, then do we need to do so, and how helpful is identifying with thought then? These questions are hard to answer. It does seem quite apparent that we do not need to rely on such a mode to function ordinarily or even effectively, we can feel our desires and thoughts arise, and use them accordingly without getting attached or identified to them. Perhaps we could even have autobiographical thoughts without getting attached to them, and use the word “I” without this narrowed feeling of being our thoughts and the thing authoring them. Although we could still act deliberately and effectively without entering this mode, and while such a mode can lead to rumination and psychological distress (beyond leading us to endorse a let’s say faulty belief in free will), it is very possible that these modes of being have their use and should not be abandoned.
This gets to a puzzle I haven’t fully solved- is the self, this sense of being a homunculus on the edge of experience (as Harris has described it), consciously writing each thought we have, best described as a harmful illusion or as an alternative mode with utility in certain areas? Even if we grant that engaging in this particular mode of cognition is not necessary for voluntary thoughts and actions, and that such a mode is ironically more liberating and enjoyable, one of my fears is that it does affect the content of our thoughts.
Intentional and Unintentional Mind Wandering Are Associated with Different Kinds of Thoughts
One reason for this fear comes from mind wandering research showing that the degree of intentionality involved in mind wandering is not completely independent of the content of individuals thoughts. Specifically, when people report voluntarily mind wandering, they are more likely to think about the future, for example. How intentional our thinking is can influence the types of thoughts that then arise. This is something determinists can appreciate- intentions, are a cause, that have subsequent effects, on the content of our thoughts in this case. Therefore, it certainly seems possible that identification with thought and/or egoic feelings could have at least some effect on resulting thoughts. Indeed, some research shows that being mindful of one’s thoughts does impact the kinds of thoughts that are likely to arise in that state, therefore that prior orientation and mode of perception and attention has some influence on the types of thoughts that arise after. Similarly, participants in studies looking at the effects of psychedelics often report feelings of increased connection and acceptance while also showing a shift in their sense of self, perhaps from disintegration of the default mode network in part. There are many factors that can influence the types of thoughts people tend to have while on psychedelics, although one factor is likely this shift in one’s sense of self, suggesting that a sense of self, or lack thereof (or different types of selfhood) can influence cognition and the content of our thoughts. This is a key point in my current perspective.
Some research suggests that a feeling of conscious ownership and/or authorship over thoughts and intentions is not necessary for them to arise and to be carried out purposefully. This seems reasonable, but the research misses what the long-term effects of such a feeling of conscious authorship and a lack of it could have, as well as what kinds of thoughts are more likely to arise when a feeling of conscious authorship is present. How reasonable is it to assume that a feeling of having conscious ownership and authorship over one’s thoughts will have no influence on the kinds of thoughts that person will have in the future? Determinists could take that position, or they could assume that this conscious authorship is not only unnecessary for voluntary behavior, but it can be harmful, which I’ll touch on shortly.
Potential Positives from Egoic States
If engaging with feelings of agency and of a conscious self have some impact on the kinds of thoughts we have, then if we were to try to abandon this mode of being, we would reduce the likelihood of having certain kinds of thoughts. Is it the case that feelings of agency and identifying with thought only lead to harmful and counterproductive thoughts? I’m not sure, but this seems like an extreme position to take. As a potential example, if we are trying to facilitate self-control, then some degree of “self talk” and identification with thought may be useful. Or a competitor trying to stay determined could occasionally recite a motivating phrase, or some kind of command (“come on focus, you got this”) and perhaps such a motivating command will be more effective and resonate the more one identifies with that thought rather than feeling detached from it. A somewhat natural theory then is that detaching from negative thoughts may be useful, however feeling more attached to certain kinds of positive thoughts could also be useful (detachment from certain positive thoughts could have use as well though, and arguably some negative thoughts that could motivate us to make a better change may be more effective if we identify with them). So much for that theory then. In short, there are many different situations and problems out there, which may require their own orientations and solutions, meaning that we may not want to limit ourselves to a narrow range of thought. If we were to only generate thoughts from agentic feelings and from identifying with thought, or if we were to only generate thoughts from a mindful egoless mode of being, then in both cases we could be narrowing the range of possible thoughts and solutions that we can generate. Having the capacity for both modes of cognition, and switching between them appropriately and flexibly, may be the most optimal for adapting to various demands, thus improving our well-being the most.
Importantly, this really hinges on the clarity of thoughts and attention that are likely to come from thought identification and thought detachment, or the kinds of thoughts that often arise from the feeling of selfhood. I’ll have to explore this in detail in another piece, but at the time of writing this, I think there is good reason to not be skeptical of all the kinds of thoughts that could arise from thought identification and the feeling of selfhood. Feeling identified with thought and in control of thought for example, could make us more selective and careful of what we think (if our thoughts are reflective of an important aspect of our identity then that could add more pressure to have constructive, coherent, and positive thoughts). Feeling like we author our thoughts and direct our attention and actions may also help motivate us to pursue our desires and values, especially if these desires and values feel self-generated. A sense of separateness can help foster a sense of individuality, which has pros and cons, as does a feeling of “oneness” with a particular group. Another clue that we may not want to completely dispense with a sense of self or agency is that it is seemingly ubiquitous, a stable adaptation. That doesn’t mean by default it will continue to serve us though, but I reckon the situations it has helped us navigate are still present today. Of course, feeling like a separate self and the source of all your thoughts and intentions, can be dangerous and if left unchecked can lead to unnecessary amounts of pride, shame, envy, anger and so forth. However, there are situations when at least small doses of negative emotions can be instrumental, for learning to avoid certain mistakes for example. This is something I’ll probably have to explore in detail elsewhere. My current position though is that we wouldn’t want to never feel anger, for example, but of course we don’t want to feel it excessively, only in situations when it is appropriate, while managed properly, to perhaps galvanize helpful thought and behavior, or simply to signal to us that we be being taken advantage of and should therefore pay more attention to this scenario to figure out a solution. Negative emotions, which sometimes arise from “egoic states”, can be useful, hence why they have evolved and persist. And if properly used, provide us with additional tools.
Summary
To succinctly summarize some main points discussed- there’s a difference between accepting an abstract proposition about the existence of free will (a belief in free will) and having feelings of agency and selfhood that seem to support the proposition or conclusion that free will is real. Therefore, free will believers shouldn’t be so fast to assume free will is real just because we have feelings of agency, and free will deniers should not be so fast to assume that these agentic feelings are illusory, unnecessary, or harmful. The belief or disbelief in free will is more likely to come online when we are reflecting on the past or the future, rather than when we are engaged in the present. This means that regardless of what our philosophical commitments and conclusions of free will are, we can all engage in the present moment in the same way; beliefs in free will need not have any consequences when we are responding to the environment or occupied in tasks that rely on outward attention. This could be true of many abstract beliefs by the way, not just free will. Further, free will skeptics do not have to handle any cognitive dissonance when embracing feelings of agency and selfhood. Both processes are caused and deterministic, but more importantly, they can be useful. Although we may be able to function properly and still carry out voluntary behaviors, plans, and thoughts without engaging in any egoic processing of identifying with thought, the orientation we adopt likely affects the kinds of thoughts and behaviors that will subsequently arise. Assuming that maximizing the diversity of thoughts and actions we’re capable of generating is adaptive for meeting the needs of many different situations, and that feelings of agency and selfhood can elicit useful thoughts and modes of attention, it should reason that it is most adaptive to properly switch between identifying with thought and not identifying with thought.
Topics for Future Writing?
The evolution of this conscious sense of self along with its benefits and drawbacks may be something that I will explore in another piece. I have thought a great deal about the topic of free will, so there is certainly much more to say. Something I didn’t discuss is the importance of predictability, especially considering the important psychological theory of “predictive processing”. The fact that we do not know for certain what will happen in the near or distant future is important and protective against fatalistic thinking. As soon as we tell ourselves that we know what will happen and base our actions around that, we are deluding ourselves. There is an odd tension though, in telling oneself that whatever one does would have been caused and inevitable, giving a false impression that one could justify whatever it is they do. Of course the important justifications or rationales for behavior ought to be whatever is deemed most reasonable and beneficial for others, ideally. Despite potentially having no libertarian free will, we still have potential and some freedom. We often fail to appreciate this due to following habitual patterns of behavior and thought, but our brain is capable of staggering change. One intention or one value, regardless of what causes it or where it comes from, has a lot of power and potential to radically alter our lives for the better.
Lastly, we should be careful not to conflate determinism or a possible lack of free will with a fixed mechanistic predictable determinism. We may be biological machines, but we are very complex ones. We do not simply reflexively react to external stimuli, we interpret and represent it which could be done in many different ways, and we try to anticipate our world, comparing our predictions and model of the world to what actually happens, continually learning and adjusting our expectations to try to minimize feelings of uncertainty over the long-term. We could be said to have “emergent freedoms”, or capacities like for reason and self-control that greatly expand our degrees of freedom and what we could choose to do in a given moment. Not every option or choice may be equally salient, or even come to mind before we make a decision. This is why evaluating our past (another capacity we’re given that expands our degrees of freedom) is helpful for learning new ways of behaving and thinking; even if we could not have acted differently than how we did in past circumstances, we can certainly learn and make changes to respond differently in the future. Even if people appear to act in simple and predictable ways, each brain possess a great deal of complexity and capacity to change, which could be tapped into intentionally or unintentionally. Recognizing the butterfly effect and all the downstream effects that could arise from one intention or goal, especially if sustained over time, we can leverage causality and continuously seek to learn and improve ourselves. Even if the future is already written in some sense, it is completely unknowable to us; from our vantage point it is a blank slate and thus should be treated like such, one that is full of potential (within bounds of course). I’ll close with a paraphrased quote I recently came across that I like, “if we could go back in time we often imagine how our choices could radically change the future for the better, yet we usually don’t see ourselves as having that capacity right now in the present to radically alter the future”.